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Abstract  
 In this research, we developed an e-health system for cases of patient's 
hospitalization. This system was integrated with an e-id based RFID. E-id 
contains patient's id, secret key, and personal identity that consist of strong and 
weak attributes. Strong attributes will be encrypted using ECC Method, while 
the authentication process will verify the validity of the patient’s personal 
identity using ECDSA method. The results show that the system which was 
developed has been able to protect the patient's personal identity. This is 
because strong attributes have been successfully encrypted. During the 
authentication process, the received message was authenticated. Therefore, 
the system that was developed is expected to increase the trust and 
confidence of patients. 
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Introduction 
 Nowadays, the ease of accessing e-health or medical care system 
plays an important role in our daily lives. The rapid development of wireless 
communications and computing technologies had an impact on the 
displacement of the health services from paper-based to the e-health service 
system. However, this also has a significant impact through increased 
efficiency, reduced storage costs and medical errors, increase data 
availability, and the ease of sharing data (Tan et al., 2008). Consequently, its 
convenience also assists in the reduction of the privacy of personal identity 
and the medical records of patients. Thus, there is an urgent need for the 
development of architectures to ensure that the issue of privacy and security 
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are imperative in safeguarding confidential information wherever it digitally 
resides (Kreps and Neuhauser, 2010). 
 Moreover, some researches focus on the security of EHR (Electronic 
Health Record), whereas privacy in health services must meet the 
requirements of anonymity and unlinkability (Ray and Wimalasiri, 2006). 
Anonymity is required if personal identity in the EHR (Electronic Health 
Record) needs to be hidden from the other party, such that the EHR cannot 
be associated with a particular patient (Guo et al., 2012). Other parties 
include insurance companies, researchers, staff management, and other 
parties who have no access or the appropriate privileges. On the other hand, 
the hospital caregivers such as doctors, nurses, and the emergency medical 
technicians (Kou-Hui et al., 2013) should be able to obtain the personal 
identity of patients. Furthermore, unlinkability indicates that multiple EHRs 
cannot be linked to the same owner. This requirement is necessary because it 
prevents the profiling of a patient by the insurance companies or the central 
servers which stores the patient’s data (Krummenacher et al., 2007). 
 In this paper, we focus on the security of personal identity in the case 
of an inpatient system. System which would be developed includes the 
patient registration protocol in obtaining e-id and hospitalization protocol. In 
addition, patients’ registers by filling out their personal identity such as 
name, address, birthdate, blood type, marriage, religion, gender, and phone 
number. After receiving the personal identity of the patient, the receptionist 
would generate a public key and a secret key. Therefore, the e-id will contain 
the id of patient, secret key, and patient’s personal identity which has been 
encrypted. Hence, this will be used during the authentication process when 
the process of hospitalization and the patient’s personal identity cannot be 
known by unauthorized parties. Thus, researchers should open up the eyes, 
give insight, and make a commitment to the security of e-health system in 
Indonesia. However, this would increase the trust and confidence of the 
public 
 
Methods 
ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) 
 Elliptic curve cryptography is a public key cryptography system that 
bases its security on elliptic curve mathematical problems. Unlike Discrete 
Logarithm Problem (DLP) and Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), there is 
no sub-exponential time algorithm that is known to solve Elliptic Curve 
Discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). Elliptic curve cryptography 
algorithms have advantages when compared with other public-key 
cryptography algorithm. In those algorithms, the key length is shorter but it 
has the same security level. Subsequently, there are three protocols of 
ECDLP which is well-known today: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
European Scientific Journal July 2015 edition vol.11, No.21  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
475 
Algorithm (ECDSA), Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), and Elliptic 
Curve ElGamal (ECElgamal).  Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is one 
approach of public-key cryptography algorithm that is based on the algebraic 
structure of elliptic curves on finite area. 
 The use of elliptic curves in cryptography was triggered by Neal 
Koblitz and Victor S. Miller in 1985.  Elliptic curves are also used in some 
integer factoring algorithm that also has applications in cryptography, such 
as Elliptic Curve Lenstra Factorization. Furthermore, public key algorithms 
based on mathematical calculations variations are fairly difficult to resolve 
without specific knowledge of how the calculations were made. Therefore, 
algorithm maker stores the private key and spreads the public key. Public 
key algorithm used to encrypt messages whereby only the algorithm maker 
would be able to solve it. Public key system such as RSA algorithm uses two 
very large prime numbers. Hence, the user chooses two random large prime 
numbers as the private key and publish the results of the calculation as the 
public key (Bangerter et al., 2004). Furthermore, factoring large numbers 
that is very difficult will maintain the confidentiality of the private key. 
Another issue concerns the algebraic calculations ab = c, where a and c are 
known. The calculations which involve complex numbers or estate could be 
easily solved using logarithms. Nevertheless, in a large finite set of numbers, 
to find a solution from such calculation is very difficult. Thus, this is often 
known as "discrete logarithm problem".  Elliptic curve can be written with 
mathematical calculations as follows (Randhawa and Singh, 2011): 
𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏                             (1) 
 Every changes in the value of  'a'  and 'b' will produce different 
elliptic curve. Elliptic Curve example can be seen in Fig. 1. Thus, Fig. 1(a) is 
a representation of elliptic curve 𝑦2  =  𝑥3 –  12𝑥 +  3, while Fig. 1(b) is a 
representation of another elliptic curve 𝑦2  =  𝑥3 –  2𝑥 +  1. Every elliptic 
curve usually defines a set of points on the field and can form albelian 
collection (collection of point with point infinite as an identity element). If 
the value of x and y that is selected is a large finite area, the solution will 
generate a finite albelian. However, the elliptic curve cryptography that is 
used in elliptic curve is defined by two finite fields. 
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Figure 1. Some  representations of elliptic curves[6] 
 
ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) 
 ECDSA is an analog elliptic curve of Digital Signature Algorithm 
(DSA). ECDSA is one of the ECC digital signatures which provide data   
authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation. ECDSA was first 
introduced in 1992 by Scott Vanstone. In 1998, ECDSA got a standard ISO 
(International Standards Organization) as ISO 14888-3. In 1999, they were 
accepted as standard ANSI (American National Standards Institute): ANSI 
X9.62. In 2000, they were accepted as standard IEEE (Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers):  IEEE 1363-2000 and standard NIST (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology) FIPS 186-2. In ECDSA protocol, the 
parties that will make the digital signature have domain parameters elliptic 
curve D = {q, FR, a, b, G,  n, h}, key pair secret key dA, and public key QA. 
Then the party that will verify the signatures have an authentic copy of D 
document and public key of QA. Therefore, the processes that occurs are as 
follows (Randhawa and Singh, 2011): 
1. Key Generation 
a. Select random integer 𝑑, whose value is between [1,𝑛 − 1] 
b. Calculate 𝑄 = 𝑑𝐺 
c. Secret key = 𝑑 and public key = 𝑄 
2. Signing 
a. Select random integer 𝑘, whose value is between [1,𝑛 − 1].  
b. Calculate 𝑘𝐺 = (𝑥1,𝑦1) 
c. Calculate 𝑟 = 𝑥1𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛, if  𝑟 = 0, back to step a. 
d. Calculate 𝑘−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛. 
e. Calculate SHA-1(𝑚) and convert the result from string to integer 𝑒. 
f. Calculate 𝑠 = 𝑘−1(𝑒 + 𝑑𝑟) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛. 
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g. Signature for message  𝑚 are (𝑟, 𝑠). 
3. Verifying 
a. Verify that 𝑟 and 𝑠 are integer between  [1,𝑛 − 1] 
b. Calculate SHA-1(𝑚) and convert the result from string to integer 𝑒. 
c. Calculate 𝑤 = 𝑠−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛. 
d. Calculate 𝑢1 = 𝑒𝑤 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 and 𝑢2 = 𝑟𝑤 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛. 
e. Calculate 𝑋 = 𝑢1𝐺 + 𝑢2𝑄. 
f. If  𝑋 = 0, then the signature is incorrect. Conversely, inverse the 
coordinates-𝑥𝑥1 from 𝑋, and calculate 𝑣 = ?̅?1𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛. 
g. Signature valid if  𝑣 = 𝑟. 
 
Secure E-health System Design 
 In this research, we proposed a secured e-health application for the 
cases of inpatient which include: 
1. Patient’s registration  
2. Data storage and processing of patient medical record information 
3. Placement of patients based on the needs of the patients. 
Privacy Requirements 
Patient will enter their personal identity such as name, address, and their 
phone number at the time of registering to become a member of e-health. 
Personal identity is divided into two parts, namely: strong and weak 
attributes. Hence, the purpose of the division is to provide greater security to 
the strong attributes. Before being put on the e-id, strong attributes such as 
address, phone number will be encrypted using ECC algorithm. At the time 
of authentication, strong attributes will not be revealed. Thus, patient's 
privacy will be maintained. 
Security Requirements 
 Some security requirements of secured e-health system are listed as 
follows. 
Authentication: E-health system can realize the authentication of messages. 
For example, when a patient sends the message M and its signature β that 
was made from the patient's private key, doctor can authenticate the 
messages by verifying the signature using public key β. The message will be 
authenticated if verifying process returns true value. 
Data Integrity: Besides message authentication, e-health system can also 
realize the integrity of data through the verification process. For example,  
patient signs the message M and send it to the doctor. Thus, to maintain the 
integrity of the message, patient can use hash function and obtain signatures 
β by calling sign algorithm with input digest M: 
β sign(h(M),Skpatient) 
Patient sends (M,  β) to the doctor. After receiving (M, β), the  doctor verifies 
the digest M as follows:  
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patient receptionist
Register as e-health member
Fill in personal identity
Insert data into e-id
Give e-id to patient
Generate key
Accept            Verify (h(M), β,Pkpatient) 
If it accept true value, then the data integrity was maintained and accepted. 
Non Repudiation: Security services are also provided by e-health system to 
prevent the rejection of the message that has been signed. For examples,  if 
patient denies that he had signed a document which he actually signed, then 
the doctor could prove that the patient ever signed that document. Therefore, 
achieving non-repudiation service requires trusted party to be an 
intermediary between doctors and patients. 
 
Patient’s Registration Protocol 
 Patients’ registers by filling out personal identity such as name, 
address, birthdate, blood type, marriage, religion, gender, and phone 
numbers. Personal identity is also regarded as attribute. Thus, there are two 
types of attributes, namely strong and weak attributes. Strong attributes are 
usually unique identity for each user, while weak attributes could be the 
same for each user. Example of strong attributes are address, birthdates, and 
phone number; while weak attributes are name, gender, blood type, marriage, 
and religion. After receiving the personal identity of patient, receptionist will 
make the process of generating public and secret key. Public key are used to 
scramble strong attributes, so that they cannot be known by unauthorized 
parties. Also, secret key are used for signing personal identity. E-id contains 
the id of the patient, secret key, and personal identity that contain strong and 
weak attributes. Therefore, the scheme of the registration protocol can be 
seen in Fig.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Issuing of e-id 
 
Hospitalization Protocol 
 After getting inpatient referral from a doctor, the patient will go to 
the receptionist. Patients performs authentication during the authentication, 
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signing, and the verifying process. However, if the authentication is 
successful, then the receptionist will check if the rooms were empty. The 
allocation of rooms is in accordance with the needs of the patient which is 
based on the illness and the request of the patient. After finding an empty 
room in accordance with the above conditions, receptionist gives a message/ 
notification to the nurse in charge. If the room is ready, then the receptionist 
tells the patients to go into the room. Therefore, the scheme of 
hospitalization protocols can be seen in Fig. 3. 
patient doctor receptionist nurse
consulting to a  doctor
examination of patient
doctor provide referrals for inpatient
authenticating personal identity
verifying patient’s data
check the empty rooms as needed of patients
send  message to nurse
nurse receive a message
nurses send a reply to the receptionist
reply received by the receptionist
receptionist informed patients that the room was ready
 
Figure  3. Flow interaction between patient and doctor 
 
Experimental Result 
 In this research, secured personal identity will be tested using PC 
with specification as shown in Table 1. In addition, RFID reader/writer and 
tag with specification as shown in Table 2 and 3 would also be employed. 
Fig. 4 shows the RFID reader/writer and the tags that were used. 
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Table 1. Specifications of PC used in experiment 
Specification Remarks 
Software Java 
O/S Windows 8 (64 bit) 
CPU Intel Core™ i5-3317U Processor (1.70 GHz) 
RAM 4 GB 
 
Table 2. Specifications of RFID reader/writer used in experiment 
Specification Remarks 
Microcontroller ATmega328 
Operating Voltage 5V 
Input Voltage (recommended) 7-12V 
Flash Memory 32 KB (ATmega328) of which 0.5 KB used by 
bootloader 
SRAM 2 KB (ATmega328) 
EEPROM 1 KB (ATmega328) 
 
Table 3. Specifications of RFID tag  used in experiment 
Specification Remarks 
Model MIFARE™ Classic 4K 
Frequency 13.56MHz 
Protocol ISO14443A 
Unique ID 32 bits 
EEPROM Size 4096 Bytes 
Material PVC 
Temperature -20°C ~ +50°C 
Dimension 85.6 × 54 × 0.86 ( mm ) 
Data transfer 106 kbit/s 
4 kB 
 
organized in 32 sectors of 4 blocks and 8 sectors of 16 
blocks (one block consists of 16 byte) 
Write endurance 100000 cycles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4. RFID reader/writer and tag 
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Figure  5. Patient’s registration form 
 
 Fig. 5 shows a registration form that must be completed by patients 
when registering as a member of e-health. Thus, the address, birthdate, and 
phone are strong attributes. Fig. 6 shows the process of making e-id. 
However, this process occurs when the patient's personal identity entered 
during registration have been received by the server. When performing the 
write process, the sequence of steps to be taken includes the selection of 
patient ID, generate key, process, COM3, and write tags. E-id contains the id 
of the patient, the secret key, and personal identity that includes strong and 
weak attributes. Strong attributes will be encrypted using ECC methods. 
Thus, it cannot be identified by unauthorized parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Write RFID form 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  7. Authentication Result 
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Figure  8. Check in form 
 
 Fig. 7 shows the results of the authentication process when consulting 
a doctor or at the time of hospitalization. During this time, patient's personal 
identity is been signed and verified using ECDSA. The experimental results 
showed that signing and verifying patient's personal identity was performed 
on strong attributes that had been encrypted. This is because patient's name 
as a weak attribute was revealed. Thus, address as a strong attributes was not 
revealed because it has been encrypted. Fig. 8 shows a check-in form. If the 
patient must be hospitalized, a room is found according to their needs.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this research, we have presented the protection of the patient's 
personal identity using ECC and ECDSA. ECC methods are used to 
scramble the strong attributes, so that the data could not be known by 
unauthorized parties. ECDSA method is used during the authentication 
process of consulting a doctor and when the hospitalization to ascertain 
whether the messages that was received is true. The results show that the 
systems made has been able to protect the patient's personal identity, because 
the strong attributes have been successfully encrypted. During the 
authentication process, the received message was authenticated. Therefore, 
the system that was developed is expected to increase the trust and 
confidence of patients. 
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